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On 27 October 1970 the Foreign Ministers of the Six)aid the foundations
of European po l it i cat cooperat ion (EPC) with the Luxembourg Report. Those
who regarded the Treaties of Paris and Rome as the paradigm for European
integration in all are.as looked on this purely intergovernmental endeavour
with a mixture of disdain and anxiety; disdain for a creature lacking a
legal basis or decision-making powers, which would be incapable of paving
the way to a European foreign pol icy, and anxiety lest the Member States
try to use the machinery of pol itical cooperation to backsl ide from the
integration that had been achieved in the Community, and regain national
freedom of act ion.
Today, ten years on from the birth of EPC, the possibi l ities and limitations
of intergovernmental foreign policy cooperation have become apparent. The
positive achievements have exceeded expectations, and awareness of the
l imitat ions has Led Member States to use the Community machinery much more
than was ever expected in the pursuit of foreign policy obje~tives, and to
seek ways of strengthening their cooperation while preserving its inter-
governmental character.
For an observer working in the Community, particular interest attaches to
the relationship between EPCand the Community institutions, and to the
recent proposals to strengthen EPC by endowing it with a certain amount of
i nfr ast ructu re.- 2 -
QrigiQ2_sQg_eria~iel~2_2f_~~rQ2~sD_e21i!i~sl_~22e~rs!i2a
The Hague Summi t of 2 December 1969
agreeq to instruct the Ministers for Foreign Affairs
to study the best way of achieving progress in the
tter of pol itical unification, within the. context
of enlargement. 
The response of the Foreign Ministers was to produce the Luxembourg
Report (Davignon Report) of 27 October 1970 (Annex 2), pr.oposing
cooperation .on matters of foreign pol icy.
EPC was not intended as the first step on the road to an eventual
Political Community , but was rooted in the perception that consensus
on the goal of "political integration" was impossible to achieve.
In formulating the objectives of EPC, the Foreign Ministers laid stress
on the principle of cooperation between sovereign states. Those
objectives were described as follows:
- to ensure, through regular exchanges of information
and consultations, a better mutual understanding on
the great international problems;
- to strengthen their .solidarity by promoting the
harmonization of their views, the coordination ff
their positions, and, where it appears possible: and
desi rable, common act ions.
In the Copenhagen Report of 23 July 1973 (Annex 4), the mipi sters
strengthened EPC structurally, but left those basic principles intact.
What they did was to spell the objectives out in greater d~tail, and
add weight to the moral obligation to respect the rul~s of! a cooperation
which lacked a formal basis in law, and which each Member State was at
liberty - at least in theory - to walk out of from one day to the next.- 3 -
- the purpose of the consultation is to seek common
policies on practical problems;
- the subject dealt with must concern European
interests whether in Europe itsel f or eLsewhere




each State undertakes as a general rule not to take
up final positions without prior consultation with
its partners ..
I I. ~~r~e~~D_g21i!if~1_fe28~t~!iQD_~!r~f!~r~~
Structurally EPC is altogether separate from the Community institutions 
reftection of its purely intergovernmental nature. The French Government
in particular consistently urged that cooperation between sovereign iVlember
States on matters of foreign policy should be kept outside the European
institutions of Brussels. It was only in 1974, with the creation of the
European Council" that Community and cooperation were brought together under
one roof:
The Heads of Government have ... decided to meet",
accompanied by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
three times a year and, whenever necessary", in the
Counci L of the Communities and in the context of
political cooperation.
(Communiqu~ issued after the Paris summit
of 10 December 1974 - Annex 7)
The second "institution" common to both Community and EPC consists of the
informal meetings of Foreign Ministers inaugurated at Schloss Gymnichp also
in  197L",
The highest-level regular forum for pol itical cooperation consists of the
ministerial meetings which in theory are supposed to take place twice in
the lifetime of each six-month Presidency, in the capital of the Member
State 14hose turn it is to supply the President. Nowadays" however" Foreign
Minister' s discuss political cooperation issues much more often than this.
Frequently" they do so on the occasion of Council meetings in BrusseLs or- 4 -
Luxembourg.
concerned.
One meeting per presidential term is still held in the capital
The EPC "steering committee" is the Political Committee ("Copo" or "PoCo
formerly known as the Davignon Committee), consisting of the Political
Directors (i  e.  the heads of pol itical divisions) of the individual foreign
ministries. This committee prepares the ministerial meetings and gives
instructions to the expert working groups. The Political Committee s function
in the EPC set-up is - to a certain extent - comparable to that of COREPER
(the Permanent Representatives Committee) in the Community framework. 
meets regularly once a month, and also often holds meetings in conjunction
with UN General Assemblies, European Counci l meetings and meetings of the
Council (Foreign Affairs).
Each Member State s foreign ministry has a "European Correspondent", who comes
under the Political Director and is in charge of coordinating participation
in EPC.
The Group of European Correspondents meets immediately before and after
meetings of the Politi cal Committee. It deals with organizational and
procedural matters and prepares the draft conclusions for ministerial and
Political Committee meetings. These conclusions, like all other political
cooperation texts, have to be approved by consensus.
There  are  also expert working groups which deal with specific regions (Africa,
Asia, the Mediterranean, Middle East, Latin America and Eastern Europe), issues
(the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) , United Nations
and UN -Disarmament) or functions, .such as the Heads of Protocol, Heads of
Communications , or senior civil servants from justice ministries (generally
Compare the situation now with that in 1973, under the Danish Presidency,
when the Foreign Ministers, at the request of their French colleague,
Michel Jobert, had to meet in Copenhagen during  the  morning to discuss
EPC matters, in particular the effects of the Yom Kippur war, then were
whisked in a Danish air force plane to Brussels for an afternoon s Council
meeting on Community topi cs, all this notwithstanding a clause in the
Copenhagen Report adopted just a few months previously, specifying that
ministers "may also, whenever they consider it necessary to consult each
other on specific subjects between meetings, meet for that purpose when they
happen to  come  together on other occasions- 5 -
referred to by their French title of "Hauts Fonctionnaires des Mini steres
de la Justice ) dealing with legal cooperation. Thus only North America
and non-EEC Western European .countries (which basically means EFTA) are
not "covered" by such a working party. The Euro-Arab Dialogue Coordination
Group i ~ a j oi!1~ community-EPC body.
The expert working groups operate under the jurisdiction of the Political
Committee and report to it. TheoreticaLLy they can operate only on the
basis of a specifi c mandate from the Committee. But exchanges of views
under the heading of "other business , embracing a wide variety of issues
and handled by experts all of whom know each other well, form an important
part of the coordination I reflex I which the national administrations have
developed.
The' pol iti cal cooperation partners keep in constant touch with each. other
via a special coded telex network known as "COREU" (after the French
correspondance europeenne
Some five thousand messages a year are exchanged through COREU. Thei 
content varies widely, ranging from a new draft declaration by the Ten to
an answer to a written question by a Member of the European Parliament, the
announcement that Mr X will represent Member State Y at the forthcoming
meeting of the Africa working group, or the coordination of positions on
some current foreign pol icy . issue. Coordination may cover such matters as
whether and on what terms the Member States are wi II ing to grant visas to
artists from a country they do not recognize which, though fairly mundane
in itself, is an example of the extent to which the Ten endeavour to harmonize
their policies.
Another essential feature of EPC is cooperation between the embassies of the
Ten in non-member countries. Concerted action by the embassies is routine
in a crisis (in Teheran, for exampLe), and coordination is particularly
intensive at UN headquarters.- 6 -
OccasionalLy the Political Committee asks the embassies of the Ten in a
particular non-member country to draft a joint report on some issue. But
such reports have sometimes been found to represent a " lowest common
denominator , so that some factors have been eliminated even at the
information processing stage.
The embassy of the Member State supplying the current President of the
Counci l (the Presidency) acts as spokesman for the Ten in diplomatic moves
or information exchanges.
Another important factor in coordination between the Ten is the system of
briefings whereby the other Member States are kept informed of the outcome
of contacts with "non-member countries. Following a visit toa non-Community
country, the minister of a Member State will report - often in person - on
his impressions to the Ambassadors of the other nine Community partners.
After a visit to a Community capital by the member of a non-EEC government,
or senior diplomat, the Ambassadors of the other nine Member States are
invited to a briefing session. This has provided an interesting new function
for Member States ' embassies in other Community countries, which had lost
something of their former importance because of the frequent face-to-face
meetings between ministers at sessions of the EEC Counci 
The Presidency takes charge of the secretari at and physical organization of
all meetings held during its term of office; these take place, with few
exceptions, in the capital concerned. It .also prepares draft declarations,
reports, conc lusions and ans~ers to parl iamentary questions. On rare
occasions, theEPC system wi II work on a draft prepared by another Member
State.
Over the years the work involved in the Presidency has become extremely
onerous, particularly for the smaller Member States (the numQer of written
questions from the European Parliament, for example, has risen considerably
since direct elections). The job is complicated further, for countries
holding the Presidency in the second hal f of the year, by the UN General
Assembly, which necessitates their organizing vast numbers of coordination
meetings between the Ten and acting as Community spokesman not only in
plenary sessions but in alrnost all committees too.- 7 -
In recent years it has become customary  for each Member State, six weeks
before t~e start of its Presidency, to assign one of its diplomats to
the current Presidency, which in turn provides the incoming country with
one of its own civil servants for the first six weeks of the new term.
I I I. !b~_~E2e~_2f_e2ii!iEfi_fe2e~r~!i2D
The main subject-matter of EPC is Member states ' foreign policy towards
non-Community countries. problems which divide Member States, such as
Northern Ireland, cannot be discussed in the EPC framework. In practice,
too, there are whole geographical areas and important aspects of foreign
pol icy which are not subject to coordination between the Ten.
This is the case, for example, with certain areas which are regarded as
out of bounds ; nothing to do with West Berl in is ever discussed in the
EPC framework, but is dealt with by the Federal Republic and the three
Western powers. The Maghreb countries have also been excluded - so far,
at any rate - albeit on a less explicit basis, and only very recently has
a country of francophone central or West Africa - Chad - appeared on an
EPC agenda.
In the field of East-West relations the first major EPC success, which was
scored with the preparation and presentation of joint positions in the CSCE,
achieved such a high level of mut-ti lateralism that after the signing of
the Final Act in Helsinki a number of Member States attempted to protect
the bilateral character of their relations with Eastern-bloc countries
against EPC "interference This had the r.esul t of restricting the work
of the Eastern Europe group for a long time to somewhat academic
studies. It is .only since Afghanistan that the working party has re.ally
become operationally active.- 8 -
The areas out of bounds also include the role of France and the United
Kingdom as permanent members of the Security Council. Their position
in this forum is determined by special tacti,al and Btrategic consi-
derations, and they are thus rarely willing to consult their Community
partners on Securi ty Counc i l votes.
Apart from these taboo areas, certain parts of th.e world seem simply
to have been overlooked by EPC, even at the organizational stage; it is
paradoxical that two regions close to the Community - Western Europe
(with the exception of the Mediterranean countries) and North America -
are not covered by regional working groups.
Pol itical relations with the EFTA countries seem to be so easy that no
coordination was thought necessary (except within the CSCE context, where
the Ten maintain close contacts with NATO members and with the
neutral and non-al igned countries).
As regards relations with the United States, EPC was long preoccupied with
procedural questions. The " Document on the European Identity" publ i shed
in Copenhagen on 14 December 1973 and the "Gymnich" formula* for consul-
tations with Washington reflect the Member States ' desire to keep foreign
pol i cy cooperation on a European basis. Also, the fact that the united
The approach was formulated by Mr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, LIlt; \J1::/llldf1
Foreign Mini ster, at a press conference following the Bonn mini steri al meeting of 11 June 1974: 
The mini sters were agreed that in elaborating common positio:ns on
forei~n policy there arises the question of consultations~i~h allied
or friendly countries. Such consultations are a matter of course in
any modern foreign policy. We decided on .a pragmatic approach in each
individual case, which means that the country holding the Presidency
wi II be authori zed by the other eight partners to hold consultations
On behalf of the Nine.
In practice, therefore, if any member of  the  EC raises within the frame-
work of EPC the question of informing and consulting an ally or a
friendly State, the Nine will discuss the matter and, upon reaching
agreement, authorize the Presidency to proceed on that basis.
The ministers trust that this gentleman s agreement will also lead to
smooth and pragmatic consultations with the United States which will
take into account the interests of both Bides.- 9 -
States, preoccupied with Vietnam, took relatively little part in the
preparatJons for the Helsinki Conference doubtless contributed to the
unexpected success of coordination between the Nine. The Member States
would undoubtedl~ have found it difficult to keep in step if Washington
had exerted pressure on them to accept US positions.
Relati.ons with the USA as such have rarely been a matter for discussion
in EPC. But in 1980, following the seizure of the American diplomats
in Teheran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, public feeling in the
US was beginning to run high against the lack of European "solidarity
and the Nine reacted, adopting measures which answered US expectations
(such as sanctions against Iran) despite doubts as to their advisability.
Certain issues likewise are excluded from EPC, the most important being
one of  the  essential components of any foreign policy, security. What
takes place in Nato is simpLy ignored by EPC. Dublin and Paris attach
thp. highest importance to the preservation of a clear-cut distinction
between the two forums.
Disarmament, on the other hand, is traditional EPC fare, in discussions
on confidence-building measures at CSCE meetings, and within the UN.
There are other foreign pol icy issues whi ch are not usually dealt with
in the EPC framework: for years the international talks on the law of
t he sea, for example, remained largely outside the province of both EPC- 10 -
and the Community since they were the preserves  of  the foreign ministries
legal divisions, sometimes less European-minded than the political or
economic divisions.
A simi lar situat ion affects coordinat ion between the Ten in UNESCO, where
in many  of  the Member States responsibility lies with the ministries 
cul ture.
Over the last few years there has also developed, as an adjunct to foreign
policy cooperation, " judicial cooperation" between ministers  of  justice; this
is also referred to as the "European legal space So far this is confined
to issues concerning extradition between Member States and certain criminal
law matters. The "Hauts Fonctionnaires" Group reports to the Political
Committee, i. e. the Political Directors  of  the foreign ministries, which
for these purposes is subor.dinate to a committee  of  ministers  of  justice.
Legal cooperation makes use  of  the EPC procedures, particularly the COREU
net work.
However, the coordination between Member States in the fight, against
terrorism (TREVI) is not part  of  political cooperation proper.- 11 -
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EPC and the Commission
In the early days following the creation of EPC in 1970, relations with
the Commission were virtually non-existent, dE~spite .a clause in the
Luxembourg Report providing that:
Should the work of the Ministers affect the activities
of the European Communities, the Commission wi II be
invited to make known its views. 
,,*
and de.spite the intention recorded by the Heaclsof State and Government
at their Paris summit on 21 October 1972
... of transforming, before the end of the present
decade and with the fullest respect for the Treaties
already signed, the whole compl~x of the relatio~s
of Member States into a European Union.
Three years after the Luxembourg Report, the Copenhagen Report of
23 July 1973 gave more expl icit acknowledgement of the need for EPC
and the Community to work togeth~r:
The political Cooperation machinery , which deals on
the intergovernmental level with probLems of int~r-
national politics, is distinct from and additional to
the activities of the institutions of the Community
which are based on the juridical commitments under-
taken by the Member States in the Treaty of Rome.
Both sets of machinery have the aim of contributing
to the development of European unification. The
relationship between them is discussed below.
The Political Cooperation machinery, which is
responsible for deal ing with questions of current
interest and where possible for formulating common
medium and long term positions, must do this keeping
in mind, inter alia, the implications for and the
effects of, in the field of international politics,
Community policies under construction.
For matters which have an incidence on Community
activities close contact will be maintained with
the institutions of the Community.
The Luxembourg Report does not lay down a procedure to be followed
should the opposite occur and the work of the Community affect the
foreign pol icies of Member States. This r~flects the fear of certain
Member States that EPC might acquire the right to oversee the
operations of Community institutions.- 12 -
The last section of the previous paragraph is
implemented in the following way:
- the Commission is invited to make known its
views in accordance with current practice;
the Counci l, through the President of the
Committee of Permanent Representatives, is
informed by the Presidency of the agreed
conclusions which result from the work of the
Pol itical Cooperation machinery, to the extent
that these conclusions have an interest for
the work of the Community.
The Copenhagen Report goes on to describe the practice which had meantime
evolved as a means of enabling the Commission to "make known its views
The Commission of the Communities has been invited
to participate in ministerial discussions and in
ses.sions of the Political Committee and of groups
of experts when the agenda of the meeting provides
for the examination of questions affecting the
activities of the Communities.
It also acknowledges that Communi ty work may affect EPC:
The Ministers will similarly be able, if it is
so desired, to instruct the Political Cooperation
machinery to prepare studi es on certain pol iti cal
aspects of problems under examination in the
framework of the Community. These reports wi II be
transmitted to the Council through the President
of the Committee of Permanent Representatives.
The Copenhagen Report showed clearly that early on in the l He' of EPC,
Commission participation in some of i~s activities had become inevitable.
A consensus had been reached among the .Member states on inviting Commission
representatives to sit in on certain meetings, at least for certain items
on the agenda.
It 1 s st ill necessary for the Ten to reach consensus if a Commi ssion
representative is to be admitted, but on most occasions such consensus
is now taken for granted.- 13 -
In the early days the Commission faced opposition to its presence in EPC
precincts from two sources. The position of the French Government, on
the one hand, was emphatic: it was opposed on doctrinal grounds to any
sort of osmosis between EPC and the Community and insisted on strict,
geographical" separation of EPC ministerial meetings and Council meetings,
a line which also naturally applied to any participation by the
supranational" institution. Many of the Member States ' diplomats, for
their part, initially expressed strong reservations too, fe~ring that the
confidentiality of EPC would be lost if the notoriously leaky Community
bureaucracy was involved.
But developments in two major areas which had been on the EPC age~da S1nce
its first ministerial meeting in Munich on 19 November 1970 (and still are),
namely East-West relations and the Middle East, showed the artifiCiality
of the rigid division between EPC and Community. Before long these two
topics, under the headings of "Preparation for the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)H and "Euro-Arab Dialogue , clearly
demonstrated the close relationship between the foreign pol icy of the
Member States and the Community s "external relations
" :
The Helsinki Conference "Basket II" largely concerned economic relations
which had been transferred from the Meml:ler States ' sphere of competence
to that of the Community. In the Euro-Arab DiaLogue too, the European
side were placing the emphasis on economic issues so that this forum would
not become simply another platform for discussion of the Middle East
conflict.- 14 -
In 1972 Commission officials were invited for the fir.st time to take part
in meetings of the CSCE  ad hoc working party Shortly afterwards, the
President of the Commission was allowed to be present at the ministerial
meetingwhi le the CSCE item on the agenda was debated.
The Euro-Arab Dialogue was inaugurated in Paris in Jl,tly 1974. Representing
the European side were Mr JacquesSauvagnargues, President of the Council,
and Mr Francois-Xavier Ortoli, the Commission President; the Arabs were
represented by Kuwait' s Foreign Minister and the Secretary-General of the
Arab League.
The inclusion of Commission officials in CSCE negotiations with non-Community
countries was rendered especially tricky by a number of problems external
to the Community and its Member States. The Eastern European countries
insisted that the CSCE was a Conference of states, and that "international
organizations" had no part to play in it. Romania, fearing an analogous
strengthening of the role of the CMEA (Comecon), held particularly fast to
this view.
After protracted discussions, a solution was found which is still in effect
today: Commission officials .are included in the delegation of the Member
State holding the Counci l Presidency and come under the name of that country
in the lists of del egat ions, but wi th thei rCommuni ty rank and dffi ce
* In deference to the principle that the Commission was excluded from meetings
of the "CSCE sub-committee , that body became an  ad hoc work ing party
whenever a Commission official took part.- 15 -
In the Euro-Arab Dialogue the Commission has performed from the outset
certain functions going beyond its normal remit, acting as the Arab
League Secretariat' s opposite number in coordinating technical contacts
between the two sides, serving as "headquarters" for the European side,
and organizing the meetings of the working committees and specialized
groups - including the Working Committee on Cultural Affairs, for
instance - when they are held in Europe.
From the very beginning of its parti cipation in EPC, the Commissiorl has
,..n to it th.t .ort y f. or, .pout  ,o"ho, of conf i ~'nt i .t  ity P'ov
groundless. As its involvement with EPC has progressed, it has seJ up
suitable structural and procedural machinery.
A special division of the Secretariat-General, under the Deputy SE..
, "'~"'. y-
General, handles liaison withEPC and coordinates the Commission s contri-
bution to its activities, alongside the divisions responsible for relations
with Council .and Parliament. Officials working in this division are
subject to the same security checks as Member States ' diplomats. Only those
Members of the Commission and those offici.a~-s. who are dir~ctly 
concerned, have access to informat ion on EPC proceedings.
Today the Commission s role in EPC is broadly satisfactory. Since 1974,
the President and the Members of the Commission concerned have been able
to attend all Ministerial meetings without restriction.- 16-
Since 1975, there has also been unrestricted Commission representation at
meetings of the Political Committee, normally in the person of the -Deputy
Secretary-General. Oddly enough, progress has been slowest at the expert
workin~ group level, and the situation ther.e is still not wholly satisfactory.
The Commission is not directly linked to the COREU network; the Belgian
foreign ministry, acting on behalf of the Presidency, sends it daily copies
of the telexes exchanged. .
Participation by the Heads of Commission Delegations outside Europe in the
coordination meetings of the Ten s ambassadors does not normally pose
problems.
The part played by the Commission in EPC is clearly quite different from its
role in the Community. The difference is made manifest at meetings; at
Counci l meetings the Commission s interlocutory role as spokesman for the
Community, as opposed to national, interest is highlighted by its place
opposite the Council President, whereas at EPC meetings the Commission takes
its place on the left of the Presidency.
It does not act as guardian of the Treaties; here there
is no Treaty to guard. Nor does it initiate or propose
action; that is the role of the Presidency. Yet it is
more than an observer, for it participates in discus.sions
(though not in decision-making), suppl ies information and
details of its own experience, and........ sometimes
helps to implement decisions. It also defends the Community
Particularly in the case of Delegations coming under the Directorate-General
for External Relations.~ 17 ~
powers against encroachment by the political cooperation
machinery. Its role, then, is peculiar, ill-defined,
requiring tact on the part of the individuals who represent
it.
To this one might add that nowadays Commission officials occasionally take
the opportunity offered by meetings of the EPC working groups to consult
Member States ' experts on the political implications of initiatives in the
field of external Community relations. This is something which is often
impossible with the Council working parties in Brussels, because of the
watertight partitioning of some Member States ' foreign ministries, where
communication between the economic divisions dealing with Community bffairs
and the political divisions re.sponsible for EPC appears to be somewh~t limited.
For the same reason, it is only very rarely that Commission representatives
are required to defend the Community s territory. Experience has shown that
the Member States ' representatives on the working groups usually avoid
straying onto Community ground, feeling that their grasp of the technical
details is inadequate to allow them to express opinions on such issues.
Relations with the European Parl iament
The Luxembourg Report provided at the outset for a degree of linkage between
EPC and Par l i ament :
In order to give a democratic character to political
unification, it will be necessary to associate public
opinion and its representatives with it.
The Ministers and members of the PoliticaL Commission
of the European Parliamentary AssembLy will meet for
a biannual colLoquy to discuss questions that are the
subj ect of consult at ion wi th in the framework of co-
operation on foreign affairs. This colloquy wilL be
held in an informal way to give parliamentarians and
Mini sters an opportunity freeLy to express their
opinions.
Philippe de Schoutheete, La Cooperation Politi que Europeenne, Brussels, 1980
(p. 56).- 18 -
The l ink was further strengthened by the Copenhagen Report:
Having regard to the widening scope of the European
Communities and the intensification of political
cooperation at all levels, four colloquies will be
held each year at which the Ministers will meet with
members of the Political Committee of the European
Parliament. For the purpose of preparing the
colloquies, the Political Committee will draw to the
attention of Ministers proposals adopted by the
European Part iament on foreign pol icy :questions.
In addition the Minister exercising the function Qf
President will continue, as in the past, to submit
to the European Parl i ament, once a year, a communi-
cation on progress made in the field of pol itical
cooperation.
It is noteworthy that the authors of this report were even then prepared
to see Parliament put forward foreign policy proposals on its awn initiative.
This fact, and the injunction to the Political Committee to draw such
prop.osals to the attention of Ministers seems rather to have been lost sight
of by EPC odles.
The Paris Summit of 10 December 1974, which came up with the idea of the
European Counci l as a means of bringing Community and EPC together under one
roof, went further to meet Parliament:
In view of the increasing role of political cooperation
in the construction of Europe, the ~lJropean Assembly
must be more closely associ ated wi th the work of the
Presidency, for example through replies to questions on
political cooperation put to him by its Members.
But then Parllament has not  yet  deVlsed a procedure for informing EPC
bodies promptly of its foreign pol icy resolutions.- 19 -
MEPS are making increasing use of this opening, and drafting answers -
requiring the consensus of the Ten, like all EPC business - is one of
the major tasks of the Presidency, parti cularly since di rect elections.
The anSw~r$ suppl i ed to parl iamentary questions, J ike, the information
garnered 'from the "colloquies" where the EPC President meets Parliament'
Political Affairs Committee,  are  often a source of frustration to MEPs,
since information can only be given on the
results of EPC,  e.  on issues where the Ten have managed to reach consensus.
These  are  almost invariably in the  form  either of common statements on
foreign pol icy matters or of common votes in international organizations
like the UN. In the nature of things Parliament is already awa.re of such
utterances before it is officially informed. The individual statements
of position by Member States' Governments which p. recede and clinch
consensus, or render it impossible, are matters on which the Governments
in question are responsible to the national parliaments and which cannot
therefore be reported on by the Presidency.
Another bone of contention is what MEPs like to call the "artificial
distinction between ' Community' and ' political cooperation ' matters
** 
The
distinction may be regrettable, but it is inevitable so long .as the
Community s external relations are regulated by a Treaty - which,  for
example, gives Parliament the right to pass a motion of censure on the
Commission - while EPC is based purely on a gentleman s agreement between
the Governments of the Member States. But why does Parli ament itself apply
this artificial distinction to its own internal affairs, without being
required to do so? For the Community s external relations are dealt with by
From 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978, Parliament put 49 written questions and
42 oral questions. Between 1 July 1979 and 30 June 1980, the numbers rose
to 111 written questions and 65 oral questions.
** 
European Par lament Resolution of 19 January 1918 on European pol itical
cooperation.-20 -
the committee on External Economic Relations, while EPC questions are
discussed by the Politi cal Affairs Committee, with the result that the
latter s debates often fail to take in all aspects of a topic.
Clearly enough, it will be even more difficult to strengthen Parliament'
role in foreign pol icy matters than in its other. spheres of activity.
Not only do national feelings run particularly high in this field, but even
the national parl iaments exercise less supervision over the detai ls of
government action than they do in domestic matters. Nevertheless, President
Anwar Sadat' s speech to the European Parliament on 10 February 1981, and
reaction in the Member States, showed that Parliament has the potential to
become a platform for debate on major 'European foreign policy questions and
to exercise a definite influence - via European public opinion rather than
directly - on the formulation of common positions in EPC.
c. Relations with the Counci 
In strict theory there are no relations between EPC and Council, other than
the fact that it is the same ministers who meet in both forums. ** The Council
Secretariat is not present when EPC affairs are discussed "on the occasion
In connection with the CSCE, for example, the MEPs on the Political Affairs
Committee are more interested in Baskets I and III than in Basket II
(cooperation), where the Community has a wide sphere of competence.
In its early years as a Community member, and even during its Presidency,
Denmark had a Foreign Minister responsible for EPC matters and another
minister with responsibility for Community affairs. The innumerable
practical problems which arose ata European level led Denmark to abandon
this division of powers.- 21 -
of Counci l meetings; its role is taken over by the Presidency. 
But the Copenhagen Report, as we have already seen, laid down certain
liaison procedures to be used whenever Council business nas implications
for the foreign poLicy of the Ten. Increasingly, the tendency is to call
on EPC for an opinion. When this happens the Chairman of the Permanent
Representatives Committee acts as Linkman between Council and EPC. 
pract ice, however, Commi ssion offi ci als, who  ar. the only ones part i ci-
pating in the work of both forums, quite frequently notify the EPC working
groups or the Political Committee if there is some Community issue affecting
the foreign pol i cy of the Ten.
Achievements and limitations
The definition of a coherent strategy for the negotiations which led to the
CSCE Final Act in Helsinki (30 July 1975) and the maintenance of a united
front throughout that four-year period enabled the Community and its Member
States to playa decisive roLe, surprising even themselves. This unexpected
success proved that the Member States carried far more weight in international
relations if they acted together. Their experience encouraged them to
continue and consolidate thei r cooperation. However, the way in which they
The Counci l secretariat is represented in the Euro-Arab Dialogue Coordination
Group. This is Logical as the group coordinates EPC and Community activities
in the Dialogue; it is therefore common to the two forums.- 22 -
acted in the CSCE context for a long while remained a fairly rare example
of the Nine adopting a concerted active poLicy. Generally speaking, they
have tended to limit themselves to commenting, through joint declarations,
on major events in international pol itics and - in so far as possible - to
voting together at the United Nations General Assembly and other inter-
national forums.
The Nine s cohesiveness has not always matched what they achieved in Helsinki.
Even where interests have coincided, this has not always been a guarantee of
success. The Cyprus question provided a sad example of this. An end to the
conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots before Greece s entry into the
Community was of cardinal importance to aLL Member States. They could have
been in a fairly strong position to contribute to a solution, given the close
relations they all had with Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and the existence of
association agreements, including financiaL protocols, linking these three
countries to the Community. The Nine were, however, unable to agree on common
operational positions.
The case of Cyprus showed that differences in interests between the Member
States are sometimes not the biggest obstacle; compromises can always be
struck. Traditional patterns of behaviour of national diplomats subconsciously
following outdated doctrines do prove to be insuperable barrieriS, however.
Thus some felt that the Greek positions should be supported almost unconditionally
whereas others supported the Turkish positions.- 23 -
The fact that the Nine have in their cooperation more often than not
confined themselves to otcasional joint declarations or coordination
in international organizations and have been unable to pursue an on-
going, active policy is attributable to the lack 9T specific EPC
instruments.
Of the three major instruments of foreign policy, namely armed forces,
budget, commercial and cooperation policy, EPC has none. And yet this
situation, in particular the absence of an army, is not always a
disadvantage. Their military impotence is one of the reasons why EPC
and the Community hold out a certain attraction for the Third World.
Neverthele.ss, the Member States were forced to recognize that the lack
of instruments severely restricted Europe s abi l ity to make its voice
heard in the world. Since there was no way of reinforcing EPC institu-
tions, they naturally discovered the resources of the Community, which
possesses two of the three instruments referred to: a budget and a
commercial and cooperation policy.
The first opportunity of which EPC was able to take advantage presented
itself in 1975: a year after the "carnation revolution" Portugal was in
the throes of a full-scale economic and political crisis; it was uncertain
whether permanent democratic institutions could be set up and the estab-
lishment of a totalitarian Marxist regime was feared; Washington was
already behaving as though it considered portugal as lost to the West.
In this situation the European Council (Brussels, 17 July 1975) offered
Portugal Community solidarity in order to contribute to the stabilization
of democracy in that country:
The European Counc i l reaffi rms that the European Community
is prepared to initiate discussions on closer economic and
financial cooperation with Portugal. It also points out
that, in accordance with its historical and political
traditions, the European Community can giv.e support only
to a democracy of a plural ist nature- 24 -
Subsequently, the European Investment Bank made available to Portugal a
special loan with an interest-rate subsidy from the Community budget and
the Commission began negotiations on improving the existing agreement
between Portugal and the Community.
Many Portuguese consider that this show of European solidarity had undoubted
impact on public opinion in Portugal and thus helped Admiral Azevedo
government to straighten out the country s pol itical situation in autumn
1975 and prepare for the first parliamentary elections in spring 1976.
Another example is the United Nations Conference held on 20 and 21 JuLy
1979 in Geneva on refugees from Indochina: in 1978 EPC established
interregionaL" relations for the fi rst time with the Association of South-
East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It took advantage of the links whi ch had
existed since 1975 between the Community and this group of countries, and a
ministerial meeting due to be held within that framework on 20 and 21
November 1978 provided an opportunity for an informal discussion between
the two sides ' Foreign Ministers on international political matters. Since
then, ongoing contacts at various levels have increased each side s aware-
ness of the other s intentions and prompted the Nine to make the South-East
Asian situation one of the principal subjects of EPC, which has enabled
them to define common operational positions. Thus ASEAN and EPC took the
initiative of convening a conference in Geneva.
At that Conference the Community budget and the support of European publ i c
opinion, which was extremely moved by the tragedy of the "boat peopLe" of
the South China Sea and of the " land people" on the border between Thailand
and Cambodia, enabled the Nine to playa decisive role and to pledge a- 25 -
considerable amount (in the event nearly 40% of the total) to the inter-
national communityl s effort to help the refugees. A number of Member
States made further bilateral contributions but there is no doubt that
the Nine could have mobilized such an amount nationally without the
Communi ty budget.
A third example of the use of Community instruments for foreign policy
purposes is very recent: the supply of agricultural produce on favourable
terms to Poland.
The European Counc i l meet i ng he ld on 1 and 2 December 1980 in Luxembourg,
which was prepared by the Foreign MinistE!rs, made a very detai led state-
ment on the situation in Poland, in which the Heads of State .or Government
declared their
wi II ingness to respond, within thei r means, to the requests
for economic support made to them by Poland"
Two weeks later, the Council of the European Communities decided, as an
exceptional measure, to make it possible for Poland to buy various
quantities of agricultural produce at favourable prices in response to the
urgent needs it had made known. The Commission then took appropriate
measures under the machinery of the common agri cultural pol icy to sell this
produce at low prices to Poland (which purchased them with credits offered
by the Member States).- 26 -
In addition to the Community instruments serving EPC there are other
reasons for closer cooperation between EPC and the Community. We have
already seen how such cooperation became inevitable when the Member
States took foreign policy initiatives in the framework of EPC affecting
areas on which the Community had jurisdiction.
Basket II of the CSCE and many of the topics covered by the Euro-Arab
Di alogue were the fi rst examples of this.
Another interesting case was the European response to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. The slowness with which EPC reacted - owing to the fact
that the Soviet military intervention took place during a holiday period,
a few days before the Presidency was transferred from Ireland to Italy -
provoked much bitter comment. It was not until 15 January 1980 that a
ministerial meeting could be held - on the occasion of a council meeting
arranged long beforehand - and a statement was put out that was necessarily
somewhat vague since it had to take account of all the individual positions
expressed by Member States earlier. Because the Commission had reacted
faster, though, the ministers were neverthe.l.ess able to take an operational
decision: on 5 January President Carter had announced that the United States
would not be delivering any more grain to the Soviet Union beyond the
8 million t it was obliged to supply under the agreement concluded with the
USSR and, on 9 January the Commission had taken interim proteative measures
to prevent Community exports to the USSR from replacing the s~spended US
suppl ies. At its meeting of 15 January the Council confi rmed ,these
measures and laid down
the principle that Community deliveries must not replace,
directly or indirectly, United States deliveries on the
USSR market. With this in mind, the Council requested
the Commission to take the necessary measures as regards
cereals and products derived therefrom and to propose
other possible measures for other agricultural products
while respecting traditional patterns of trade.- 27 -
The discussion of the various aspects of the Afghan crisis introduced a
considerable innovation: Political Directors and Permanent Representatives
were present together at the ministers ' discussions. Even today it is
still not quite clear when the EPC ministerial meeting ended and the council
meet i ng beg an.
A third area of collaboration between EPC and the Community involves those
cases where there are specifically "political" aspects to Community
activities. We have seen that the Council can, according to the Copenhagen
Report, " instruct the Pol itical Cooperation machinery to prepare studies on
certain pol iti cal aspects of problems under examination in the framework of
the Community" and that the Commission occasionally directly asks t'he opinion
of the Pol itical committee or of an EPC expert working group. However, an
EPC body may seize upon the "political" aspect of a Community matter on its
own initiative.
Examples of this are:
the question of whether to continue the negotiations betw~en the Gommunity
and the Andean Pact on an economic cooperation agreement after the
military  coup d'6tat in Bolivia;
the question of whether the start of the second phase of the Association
Agreement with Cyprus could exacerbate the division of the island;
the compatibi l ity of possible Community aid for a certain non-member
country with the Member States ' foreign policy intentions.
There are, however, cases where neither EPC nor Community bodies take the
initiative of discussing the "political" aspects of a Community matter in
EPC. The negotiations on the conclusion of a trade agreement between the
Community and China, for instance, were never debated within EPC, despite- 28 -
the political importance attached by the Pekin Government to those
negotiatiO'ns, which in its view were an expression of its openesS
towards the West. 
The negotiations between the Commission and the Counci l for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA/COMECON) provide an example of an area where
CommissiO'n and Member state officials in the COREPER wO'rking party
have accumulated so much experti se in both the pol itical and economic
aspects that there would be no point in referring the matter to the
EPC' s Working Party on Eastern-European Countries. The.. Commission has
confined itself to keeping the Political Directors informed of the
progress, or rather lack Df progressl in the matter.
Of course EPC's new activities are not restricted to the .grey area
between the Member states ' and the Community s jurisdiction. The most
spectacular initiative of recent years was taken in 'an area which is
outside the Community s scope: the European Council' s Venice Declaration
(12 and 13 June 1980) O'n the Middle East and the contact-making mission
entrusted succes.sively to' Mr Thorn and then Mr van der Klaauw.
It is still toO' early to pronounce on the Venice mission s ch~nces of
success but the fact that the Nine were able to initi ate it apd prepare
joint ly an analysis of the essenti al ingredients of a solution to the
conflict is already a considerable achievement in itself, for, when EPC
was established in 1970 the Member States . positions differed considerably
on this problem but the interminable discussions on the Middle East at all
levels of political cooperatiDn have gradually brought the positions closer
to'gether. The Nine s unity of action, howeverl suffered  considerable
blow: whi le the Venice mission was taking place - and despite it - the Nine
went their own different ways in United Nations General Assembly votes on a
number of Middle Eastern issues: Palestine (France and Greece abstained;
According to' an American political science theory the difference between
EPC and Community matters corresponds to that between "high politics" and
low politics" - an unconvincing theory cO'nsidering that while the Community
was negoti ating this trade agreement with the People s Republ ic O'f China
EPC coordinated the Member States ' pO'sitions on visa applicatiO'ns from
certain visitors from Taiwan.- 29 -
the others voted against); the Middle Eastern situation (France, Ireland
and Italy abstained; the others voted against, except Greece which voted
for), Israeb nuclear weapons (Denmark and Netherlands voted against;
others including Greece abstained).
The degree of cohesion among the Member States at United Nations General
Assemblies is also an indicator of EPC' s succeSses and setbacks in fields
other than the Middle East. Outside the United Nations context the
failure of an att.empt to present a common front is not necessarily noticed,
whi le at General Assembl ies the cards have to be laid on the table i and each
disagreement between the Ten is formally noted.
The Nine s voting record in New York over the past few years would seem to
indicate that EPC has gone as far as it can with its present structures.
Whi le the number of subjects on which there has been coordination has grown
the percentage of joint votes has remained more or less stable since 1974,
fluctuating between 80% and 84% during that period Where there have been
differences, the voting pattern is not only  yes/abstention  or nolabstention
but there has been a disappointingly large number of  yeslno  or  yesl  abstent ion!
no votes, often on important resolutions. At the last General Assembly there
were three-way split votes on the following subjects: decolonization, apar-
theid, UNITAD and the legal aspects of the neW world economic order. Some
progress can, however, be seen as since 1977 no Member state has voted in
favour of draft resolutions openly criticizing another Member State.
These votes were prior to Greece s accession to the Community and EPC. The
Greek positions are likely to be more closely aligned 10 certain cases with
the EPC positions at the next General Assembly.
These statistics give only a rough idea as the votes are not all of equal
importance and the number of votes per subject may vary considerably from
one General Assembly to another.- 30 -
This situation would seem to indicate that EPC has not sparked off a
gradual process of al ignment of the Member states ' foreign pol icies
which would one day pave the way for a common foreign policy.
Admittedly the pragmatic way in which EPC has deve~oped and its very
flexible procedures have undeniably enabLed it to achieve, at least
in certain areas, a remarkable degree of cohesion among the Member
States and to increase their weight in international forums.
The involvement of a large number of officials (from desk officer level
upwards) in the coordination procedures - in meetings or through COREU -
has had a definite effect on the Member States ' decision-making: often,
when a new problem arises, the national authorities immediately find out
about their partners ' positions and take account of their interests.
The fact that the presidency supplies the EPC' s secretariat has an
educati ve" effect on its diplomats. For six months they are obl iged
to work as "Europeans , their traditional instructions being coloured by
thei r new role: they produce drafts of answers to parLi amentary questions
for instance, which are often different from their country s traditional
position, and have to explain to their astonished minister that this. draft
is the only one which has any chance of being accepted by the other nine
partners. Thi s kind of experience wi II not be forgotten at the end of the
Presidency. The officials concerned ~ill continue to have this coordination
reflex" whether they remain in their capital or serve abroad.
The purely intergovernmental nature of EPC also contri.butes to this willing-
nes.s to cooperate. An observer with experience of the Communi ty institutions
is struck by the extreme frankness at meetings of EPC working groups, where
everyone is ready to share confidential information with his colleagues -
which distinguishes these meetings from those of COREPER working parties in- 31 -
Brussels. The fact that there is no treaty, Community institutions or
conflict of powers between the Community and the Member States is probably
the main reason for this. In Brussels the national civil servants are
faced with proposals from the Commission; it is their job to ensure that
the interests of their country are taken adequately into aceount in those
proposals and their attitude is therefore inevitably defensive. In EPC
no Community interest can be set against the specific interest because
there is no voice to express it. There are merely diplomats from the
Member States, trying to work out a common position together. If they
fail, each Member State will do what it wants. Moreover, the national
experts have no fear of being dispossessed; the pres.ence of a Commission
official is certainly not regarded as a threat to their powers.
An  esprit de corps is beginning to take shape among diplomats from the
Member States. Social ties between them often have that air of familiarity
characteristic of contacts between diplomats from the most "British"
Commonwealth countries. There is no doubt that the way a country s foreign
policy is implemented i5 not determined only by a minister s instructions
but is also influenced by its diplomats ' subconscious refLexes. We have
seen how national reflexes prevented the Nine from conducting an active
pol icy in respect of Cyprus; simi larly, it can be assumed that the coordi-
nation reflexes will contribute to an alignment of the Ten s positions on
forei.gn policy matters.- 32 -
All these advantages of a very flexible intergovernmental structure cannot,
however, hide its faults and limitations:
(i) in the absence of any central body the qualities (or lack of
qualities) of a small number of Presidency officials have
direct repercussions on the Member States ' cohesion and EPC' 
product i vity;
(in each Presidency needs a running-in period and it is difficult
to maintain a satisfactory degree of continuity despite the
secondment of dip lomats before and after the change-over. The
Nine I s slowness in reacting to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, which took place a few days before the change of
Presidency, has highlighted this;
(iii) an international crisis makes it very difficult, at any time of
the year, to convene the Political Committee for an emergency
meeting because it also means that the Political Directors must
be present in their respective ministries;
(iv) the Presidency s workload is becoming unbearable for the small
member countries, particularly during the second half of the
year, when the United Nations General Assembly makes (additional
demands. The number of contacts that have to be maihtained by
the President-in-Office personally with ministers or other
politici.ans in non-member countries is greater than the Foreign
Ministers can handle, particularly in the big member countries,
which have to maintain theircountry s bilateral relations as
The Luxembourg Report provides for an emergency procedure:
Should a grave crisis or a matter of particular urgency arise, extra-
ordinary consultations wi II be arranged between the Governments of the
Member States. The Chairman will get in touch with his colleagues in
order to determine the best way of ensuring such consultation.
However, the weakness of this emergency procedure is the requirement
that, in EPC, there has to be a consensus on all matters, even the
dates of meetings.- 33 -
well as coping with the Presidency;
( v) too often politicians in the Member States forget the
undertaking in the Copenhagen RepQrt not to fi~ their
own position definitively without having consulted
their partners. In many cases it proves impossible
to adopt common positions because one or other 
partners has made a publ ic pronouncement in favol
a given policy which subsequently fails to meet 
the approval of the others.
VI. ~!r~~ 9  !b~ OiO9  - fQQ~~r 2!iQQ
The time seems to have come to strengthen EPC. In recent months many
politicians in the Community have argued along t ese . lnes. 
their 1 November 1980 meeting the Foreign Ministers instructed the
Political Committee to submit to them options for possible improve-
ments to the operation of EPC. All the signs indicate that this
matter will become one of the major issues for the United Kingdom
Presidency during the second half of 1981. A third report onEPC
could be the result.
Mr van der Klaauw, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, for instance,
intends to set aside 30 working days for contacts to be taken up
in the context of the Venice Middle East missi'on.
For example, Lord Carrington in Hamburg on 17 November 1980, Mr Jenkins,
the then President of the Commission, in Brussels on 6 November 1980,
Mr Genscher in Stuttgart on 6 January 1981 .and Mr Colombo in Florence
on 28 January 1981.- 34 -
So far, the suggestions offered can be divided into three categories:
strengthened commitment on the part of the Member States; better crisis
management procedures; and improvements to EPC structures.
strengthened commitment from the Member States
It is quite clear that, at the moment, the Member States are simply not
prepared to abandon t he consensus requi rement for foreign po l i cy dec i s ions.
For this reason, a recent proposal made by President Giscard
Estaing on French television aroused widespread negative reactions from
the smaller Community countries. What he suggested was that in certain
cases the task of defining the joint position should be left to those who
aimed to make a positive contribution on major international issues
e. the Community s "Big Four
If there is to be a common European policy, it must not be aligned on the
weakest stand or the slowest movement. The Community is now ten strong,
and on pol itical matters the rule of unanimity is the only one possible.
I can see no way .of forcing a country to adopt an international policy
stand against its wilL.
The snag with this system is that Europe could end up always in a weak
posture, taking the weakest stand. So we need to approach this in a
practical light. I am certain that the major European countries, the
Federal Republic, Britain, Italy and France, aim to make a positive contri-
bution on major international issues. Is this aim shared by all our
partners? Are they equally keen to take action? I am not sure that all of
them  are.  This means that we must improve political cooperation, those
who wish to must develop it further , while keeping the system flexible
enough so that the voice of Europe does not necessarily have to be Europe
most timid voice
Interviewer: "You re talking about a "directoire
......
, it' s not a directoire . It depends on what the individual countries
want. If they want to participate in an active policy - the ones I'
seen recently do want to, and have shown this - then they will participate.
If other countries, for domestic reasons, don t want to, then they should
not obl ige the others to adopt too timid and weak a stand"
Le Monde , 29 January 1981).- 35 -
This suggestion in fact implies abandoning the principle of unanimity,
but only at the expense of the smaller countries, whi le the larger ones
would retain their veto powers. Furthermore, the risk of a country
finding itself in a minority is not counterbalanced here - as it is in
the Treaty of Rome - by the rule that there should be a proposal from
a Community body, representing the common interest. President Giscard
put his proposal as a sort of analogy to the idea of a "two-tier
Community, to which the smaller countries would retort that it is not
necessari ly the Big Four who are keenest to see Europe express itself
with a sing le voice. 1hey might add that what prevents action by the
Ten is not usually certain Member States ' opposition to a joint initi-
ative, but their diverging views of what the initiative should consist
of. The proposal has therefore widely been regarded as a revamped version
of the old idea of a "Directoire The smaller. members woul.d ats9
undoubtedly point out that France has invariably been one of the first
to insist on identity of membership between the Community and EPC.
This is an important point; cooperation restricted to a few Member States
only would necessari ly forfeit the use of Community instruments, which,
as we have seen, can prove valuable.
Unti l the Member States are prepared to .advance beyond the atage of
intergovernmental cooperation, they will remain prone to the difficulties
inherent in this type of action. Any attempt to compel the minority to
align itself on the majority, irrespective of which side contained "big
or "small" countries, would spell the end of political cooperation.
There is no forcing consensus, but equally there is nothing to prevent
the Member States strengthening the "obligation" to  seek common positions.
There is realty no need for new ru.les or another report; all that is
needed is a more .serious commitment to the undertakings given in the
Copenhagen Report to "consult each other on all important foreign policy
questions" and "not to take up final positions without prior consultation
with .... partners- 36 -
Crisis management
The procedural rules whereby meetings are convened are probably the
only ones for which the strict consensus requirement could be waived
in an emergency. The inabil ity of the Nine to reach agreement on a
date for ministers . or Political Directors I meetings for three weeks
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a traumatic experience for
all concerned. The promise to refrain from taking up final positi.ons
without first consulting the partners becomes impossible to keep if
consultation cannot actually take place.
Lord Carrington s suggestion that a meeting be convened automatically
within 48 hours whenever three Member States judge that a crisis calls
for prompt consultations seems to be the only recent proposal for an
improvement which might prove acceptable to all partners at this stage.
Structural improvements
Most of the proposed changes involve structural improvements, which
tend to mean the creation of a certain amount of infrastructure for
the Presidency. In this connection the idea of a political secretariat;
something which for years constituted a stumbling block to: any progress,
has now been resurrected. When this was fi rst mooted, the French
Government insisted that it be set up in Paris, away from Brussels, to
underl ine the fact that it was not a Community institution; other Member
St ates were opposed to th is line of t hi nk i ng.. and preferred to do
without a secretariat altogether rather than have one which was not in
Brussels.
The various proposals differ according to the degree of permanency of
the infrastructure envisaged and its location. In theory; anp aside
from the specific proposals which have been put forward, the different- 37 -
possibilities are:
Providing the foreign ministry of the Presidency with diplomats seconded
from the other Member States:
(a) "troika
(b) peripatetic secretariat,
Setting up a secretariat in Brussels~
(a) completely separate from the Community institutions
(b) making use of the Council Secretariat's facilities
(c) integrated in the Council Secretariat, but made up of
Member States ' diplomats
(d) as a department of the Counci l Secretariat
(e)  as part of the Commission
Setting up a secretariat in Paris (or anywhere else other than Brussels).
1 . The proposals aimed simply at strengthening the Presidency s foreign
ministry by seconding diplomats from the other Member States are
undoubtedly less ambitious than the others. Theoretically there is
no reason why they could not be implemented without any change in
EPC rules, merely by agreement between the Member States concerned.
Integrating "foreign" civi l servants into a ministry has turned out
to be less difficult than might have been supposed; the diplomats
seconded to such posts for the weeks prec.eding and following a change
of Presidency play an unrestricted part in the host ministry s EPC'
management. And once, in 1977, a diplomat from the outgoing (UK)
Presidency was in fact seconded for six months to the following
Presidency (Belgium). It does look as though one reason why this
example has not been imitated has been the Member States ' anxiety
to prove that they could cope with the work of the Presidency by
themselves.- 38 -
But the spiralling workload might well prompt them to accept some type
of back-up  for  the Presidency, provided all Member States could agree
to it.
The two possible variants, the "troika * or the peripatetic secretariat,
differ only in respect of the number of Member Stat~s whose diplomats
would be seconded to the Presidency and by the potential length of
secondment. In both cases the seconded diplomats would help the Presi-
dency draft texts, keep in regular contact with the embassies of non-
Community countries (particularly "friendly and allied countries ), and
handle the actual administration of the secretariat. Conceivably, a
seconded diplomat could even head an expert working group. The peripatetic
secretariat variant would also enable a forgotten scheme  from  the
Copenhagen Report to be realized - the setting up of a special analy.sis
and resear~h group to undertake medium and long-term studies.
This approach does, however, have its technical limitations because of the
fai lure to provide  for  a permanent headquarters; few of the Member States 
diplomats would be keen to accept a post involving six-monthly removals.
A peripatetic secretariat, therefore, would consist largely of" young civil
servants at the start of thei r careers.
2. There would be no problems of this type  a permanent pol iti cal secretariat
were to be set up in Brussels, naturally. At first blush, this kind of
The "troika" (the incumbent Presidency plus its immediate predecessor and
successor) was invented  for  the purposes of contacts with non-member stat~s.
In the case of the Euro-Arab Dialogue it represents a compromise  for  use at
meetings where representation of Europe by all the Member States was considered
excessive, and representation by the Presidency alone inadequate. The "troika
is also used  for  EPC-Turkey information exchanges.- 39 -
administrative facility looks like a step towards the distant (and not
unani mously accepted) goa l of a common foreign po li cy. Located next
door to, or even within, the Community institutions, it could help the
Presidency with the EPC secretariat work, undertak~ studies more
exhaustive than those carried out by the working groups, operate as a
medium and long-term think-tank, and help coordinate EPC and Community
activities. The different possible forms (a)-(e) of a Brussels-based
political secretariat are broadly similar as regards their scope for
action at this stage, but they present a variety of options for the
longer term. The establishment of organizational ties with Community
bodies in particular would be consistent with the objective of the Paris
summit of 21 October 1972 of "transforming, .... with the fullest respect
for the Treaties already signed, the whole complex of the relations of
the Member States into a European Union.
However, it may be doubted whether a political secretariat, whatever its
form, located anywhere other than the capital of the Presidency could
really help strengthen the structure of EPC. Foreign policy is to a great
extent a matter of communication. The everyday duties of a diplomat call
for access to the continuous flow of information received by his ministry,
via the country s embassies abr.oad and foreign representations accredited
to its government. If he is cut off from this flow, his work ceases to be
operational and becomes confined to more or less academic studies. This
would be the danger facing a pol iti cal secretari at from the outset. Such
offi cials would have a function very different from that of the diplomats
working with the Presidency in its capital. In the eyes of the national
admini strations such a secretariat would be an autonomous body, regarded
with slight suspicion. A specific foreign diplomat, integrated into the
host ministry, can be authorized to have access to all necessary information,
but it is inconceivable that any national administration would reveal all
its cards to an international body, irrespective of whether it was staffed- 40 -
by diplomats on secondment or actual Eurocrats. The i mmedi ate result would
be the development of an anti-centralist pull. National civil servants
would soon be asking "Does that particular piece of information really need
to be passed on to Brussels?", and if in doubt would play safe and keep it
to themselves.
Another type of problem would also arise. I have already noted that the
discussion is franker in .EPC meetings than in COREPERworking parties, and
attributed this important advantage of EPC to the fact that the national
experts working within it are not continually on the defensive against
competing claims for Jurisdiction from a Community organ. But a political
secretariat would naturally (and designedly) tend to try for common positions,
sometimes' in the face of reluctance on the part of the national delegations,
who would react by restricting the transfer of information. That, however,
is as far as the analogy with the Commission faced with a tOREPER working
party wi II stretch; the Commission, after all, can fall back on the powers
conferred on it by the Treaty, while a political secretariat would h.ave no
such defence.
There seems to be noway of simultaneously maintaining the strictly inter-
governmental character of EPC and improving its effi ciency by incorporating
in it an independent element. Admittedly, EPC would not be the first
inter-governmental organization to have a permanent secretariat, but inter-
national organizations are usually established by an agreeme~t conferring
certain powers on their institutions.
3. A secretariat located in Paris would be subject to the same 9roblems as one
in Brussels, without any of the latter s advantages when it came to improving
the coordination of Community activities and EPC initiatives. And it would- 41 -
have two major drawbacks.
Firstly, the policy until now - and it has been a wise one - has been to
avoid establ ishing European institutions in the capitals of the larger
Member States. A political secretariat in Paris would fuel the smaller
Member States ' fears of a "Directoire
Secondly, Europe - and this appl ies parti cularly to Parl iament - is
already suffering from a surfeit of Community capitals. A secretariat
located in Paris would be one more obstacle to the rationalization o
European integration.
The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that a low-key approach which
preserves the character of EPC unchanged would allow limited but definite
improvements to its delicate structure. The more ambitious proposals do
not appear to take sufficient account of the fragility of a fabric which
lacking a binding contractual basis, has grown out of a plethora of
different relationships some of which belong more to the realms of socio-
logy or psychology than to the science of administration.
Another approach to the strengthening of EPC
The time is not  yet  ripe for bold qualitative changes; the transition to a
formula with greater coercive force cannot take place in isolation in the
foreign policy field. It will depend on the Community itself making signifi-
cant progress.
Unti l that time comes, it seems best to inch forward with a series of very
gradual adjustments. It therefore becomes necessary to see whether there is
a way of strengthening the EPC machinery without setting up a central body.
One proposal intended to deal with a technical problem arising from enlargement
offers a possible way forward. With Greece s accession the lines of communication
between the outlying Member States have become so stretched that taking part in a
one-day meeting in the capital of the Presidency involves two days ' travelling time.- 42 -
It has therefore been suggested that all meetings of expert working groups,
and perhaps of the Political Committee too, should be held centrally, in
Brussels.
This system would enable the Member States gradually to build up their
own infrastructure in Brussels. Initially, they could second one or two
experts on the main EPC is.sues to thei r Permanent Representations to the
Community. This would mean that experts dealing with the Middle East or
Afghanistan, for instance, could meet within a couple of hours of a meeting
being called, thus making for easier crisis management. The same people
would of course cover their subjects in the Community framework too, which
would improve coordination.
After the running-in period, Member States could even base Deputy Pol itical
Directors in Brussels, which would give EPC an element of greater continuity.
Within a matter of years, an organization parallel to COREPER would be built
up to take charge of all the work which it is thought today a political
secretariat should handle. Such an organization, however, would retain the
strictly intergovernmental character of EPC, and would not arouse anti-
ce"tralizing reactions in the different capitals.
There would be no need for any intergovernmental arrangement or treaty to
institutionalize EPCuntil a later stage, when it had become consolidated
and more closely linked with the Community. It would be better able to
withstand the likely strains between the centre and the capitals, and a
codification of the EPt  acquis would be less likely to constitute an obstacle
to further development.Annexes
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15.
They agreed to iItstruct the Mini~tel's for Foreign Affairs
to study the best way of achieving progress in the mattl~r
of political unification, within the context of enlargement. .
The Ministers would be expected to report before the end
of July 1970.
ANNEX 1ANNEX 2
2. First Report  of  the Foreign Ministers to
the Heads  of  State and Government 
the Member States  of  the European
Community  of  27 October 1970
(Luxembourg Report)
Under the chairmanship  of  the Federal Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Walter Scheel, .the Foreign Ministers of
the six European Community countries, on 27 October
1970, in Luxembourg, finally approved, on behalf of
their Governments, the report made pIJrsuant to
para. 15 of the Communique .of The Hague 011 20 July
1970.
The Foreign Ministers agreed to pIJblish the report on
October 30, 1970.
The following is the text of the report:
Part One
The Ministers for Foreign Affairs  of  the Member States
of the European Communities were instructed by the
Heads  of  State or Government who met at The Hag11e On
1 and 2 December 1969 "to study the best way 
achieving progress in the matter of political unification,
within the context  of  enlargement" of the European Com-
munities.
In carrying OIJt this mandate, the Ministers were anxiolJs
to preserve the spirit of The HagIJe CommlJniqlJc. In 
the Heads of State or Govemment noted in partiCUlar
that with the entry into the final phase  at  die Connnon
Market the building  of  EIJrope had reached "a tIJrningpoint in itS history ; they affirmed that "the European
Communities remain the original nucleus from which Eu-
ropean unity has been developed and intensified"; finally,
they expressed their determination "to pave the way for a
united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in
the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution
commensurate with its traditions and its mission
The Heads of State or Government expressed thei.r com.
mon conviction that a Europe composed of States which,
while preserving their -national characteristics, are united
in their essential interests, assured of internal cohesion,
true to its friendly relations with outside countries, con-
scious of the role it has to play in promoting the relax-
ation of international tension and the rapprochement
among all peoples, and first and foremost among those of
the entire European continent, is indispensable if a main-
spring of development, progress and culture, world equili-
brium and peace is to be preserved"
A united Europe conscious of the r~sponsibilities incum-
bent upon it by reason of its econ.1mic development, its
industrial potemial and its standar" of living, intends to
crease its efforts for the benefit of the developing coun-
tries with a view to establishing tru~tful relations among
nations.
A united Europe must be founded upon the common
heritage of respect for the liberty and the rights of men,
and must assemble democratic States having freely elected
parliaments. This united Europe remains the fundamental
aim which should be achieved as soon as possible through
the political will of its peoples and the decisions of their
Governmems.Consequently, the Ministers held the view that  for  the
sake of continuity and in order to meet the ultimate goal
of political union in Europe, so strongly underlined by
'The Hague Conference, their proposals had to proceed
from three considerations.
First, shape ought to be given, in the spirit of the pre-
ambles to the Treaties of Paris and Rome, to the will for
political union which has not ceased to further the prog-
ress of the European Communities.
Second, the implementation of common policies already
adopted or about to be adopted requires corresponding
developments in the political sphere as such so that the
time will come nearer when Europe will be able to speak
with one voice. It is therefore important that the con-
struction of Europe should proceed in successive stages
and that the most appropriate method of, and instruments
for, joint political action should gradually develop.
Third, Europe must prepare itself to exercise the responsi-
bilities which to assume in the world is both its duty and
a necessity on account of its greater cohesion and its
increasingly important role.
10.
The present development of the European Communities
requires Member States to intensify their political co-op-
er;ltion and provide in an initial phase the mechanism  for
harmonizing their views regarding international affairs.
Thus, the Ministers felt that effortS ought first to concen-
trate specifically on the co-ordination of foreign policies in
order to show the whole world that Europe has a politicalmission. For they are convinced that progress in this
direction would favour the development of the Communi-
ties and make the Europeans more conscious of their
common responsibility.
Part Two
The Ministers propose the following:
Desirous of making progress in the field of political
unification, the Governments, decide to co-operate in the
sphere of foreign policy.
1.  Objectives
The objectives of this co-operation arc as follows:
-to ensure, through regularex:changes of information
and consultations, a better mutual understanding on the
great international problems;
to strengthen their solidarity by promoting the harmoni-
zation of their views, the co-ordination of their posi-
tions, and, where it appears possible and desirable
-common actions.
ll. Ministerial Meetings
On the initiative of the Chairman, the Ministers - for
Foreign Affairs will meet at least every six months.
If they feel that the gravity of the circumstances or the
importance of the subjects in question so justify, their
meeting may be replaced by a conference of Heads of
State or Government.
Should a grave crisis or a matter of particular urgency'
arise, extraordinary consultations will be arranged be-
tween the Governments of Member States. The Chairman
will get in touch with his colleagues in order to determine
the best way of ensuring such consultation.The Minister for Foreign Mfllirs of the country having
the chair in the Council of the European Communities
will chair the meetings.
The ministerial meetings will be prepared by a committee
composed of the Directors of political affllirs.
III. Political Committee
committee composed of the Directors of political
affairs will meet at least four times a year to prepare the
ministerial meetings and carry out any tasks delegated to
them by the Ministers.
Further, the Chairman may, in exceptional cases, and
after having consulted his colleagues, convene the Com-
mittee either on his own initiative or at the request of one
of the members.
The chairmanship of the Committee will be subject to
the same rules as those which apply to ministerial meet-
ings.
The Committee may set up working groups to deal with
special matters.
It mayappoinr a group of experts to collect material
relating to a specific problem and to present the possible
alternatives.
Any other form of consultation may be envisaged where
necessary.IV. Subjects for COfJSllltation
Governments will consult on all important questions of
foreign policy.
Member States may propose any question of their choice
for political consultation.
V. Commission of the European Communities
Should the work of the Ministers affect the activities of
the European Communities, the Commission will .be in-
vited to make known its views.
VI. Europeal~ Parliamentary Assembly
In order to give a democratic character to political uni-
fication, it will be necessary to associate public opinion
and its representatives with it.
The Ministers and members of the Political Commission
of the European Parliamentary Assembly will meet for a
biannual colloquy to discuss questions that are the subject
of consultation within the framework of co-operation on
foreign affairs. This colloquy will be held in an informal
way to give parliamentarians and Ministers an opportuni-
ty freely to express their opinions.
V II. General Provisions
The meetings will as a general rule be held in the country
whose representative is in the chair. 
The host country will make the necessary arrangements
to provide the $~retariat and the material organization
of the meetings.Each country will designate an official of its Ministry
of Foreign Affairs who will liaise with hi3 counterparts
in the Other countries.
Part Three
In order to ensure continuity in the task. undertaken, the
Ministers propose to pursue their stUdy On the best way
of achieving progress in the field of political unification,
and to present a second report.
This study will also deal with the improvement of co-
oper:nion in foreign policy matters and with the search
for other fields where progress might be achieved. This
study must take into account work undertaken within the
European Communities especially with a view to rein-
forcing their structures and thus, if need be, to enable
them to liye up to their increasing and developing tasks.
To this end, the Ministers instruct the Political Committee
to arrange its actiyities in such a way that it will be
able to fulfil this task, and to present a summary report at
each biannual ministerial meeting.
The Chairman of the Council will once a year address
a communication to the European Parliamentary Assem-
bly on progress in that work.
Notwithstandi'1g any interim reports which they may
consider worth submitting if their deliberations 80 permit,
the Ministers for Foreign Affairs will present their second
full report not later than two years after the commence-ment of consultllUons on foreign policy. Thllt report must
contain Iln assessment of the results obtained by those
consultations.
Part Four
Proposals concerning association of the applicant coun-
tries with the work envisaged in parts II and III of the
Report.
The Ministers emphasize that there is 11 correlation be-
tween membership in the European Communities and
p:micipation in the activities designed to help achieve
progress in the field of political unification.
Since the applicant countries must be consulted on the
objectives and procedures described in the present Report
and since they must adhere to them once they have become
members of the European Communities, it is necessary to
keep those countries informed of progress in the work 
the Six.
In view of those differellt objectives the foHowing proce-
dures for informing the applicant countries are suggested: 
(a) Meeti.ngs of the Ministers
At each of their biannual meetings the Ministers wi!! fix
the date of their next meeting.
They wiH at the same time propose a elate for a ministerial
meeting of the Ten. That date shall be as close as possible
to that of the meeting of the Six and shall normally be
after it; in fixing that; date such occasions shall be borne
in mind when the ten Ministers or some of them meet
anyhow.After the ministerial meeting of the Six the Chairman
shall inform the applicant countries of the questions which
the Ministers propose to put on the agenda of the
ministerial meeting of the Ten, and shall furnish them all
other information likely to make the exchange of views
of the Ten as fruitful as possible.
In view of the fact that the information and the exchange
of views must be marked by a certain flexibility, it is
understood that they will be. intensified once the agree-
ments on the applicant countries' accession to the Euro-
pean Communities have been signed.
(b) Meetings of the Political Committee
This Committee will furnish the applicant countries the
information likely to be of interest to them. The informa-
tion shall be transmitted by the Chair to whom those
countries shall address their response, if any. The Chair
wit! report on it to the Political Committee.Excerpt from
ANNEX 3
Statement of the Conference of the
Heads of State and Government of the
Member Stat~,'9~' :the European Com-




The Heads of State or of Government agreed that political
co-operation between the Member States of the Com-
munity on foreign policy matters had begun well and
should be Still further improved. They agreed that consul-
tations should be intensified at all levels and that the
Foreign Ministers should in future meet four times a year
instead of twice for this purpose. They considered that the
aim of their co-operation was to deal with problems of
current interest and, where possible, to formulate common
medium and long-term positions, keeping in mind, inter
alia, the international political implications for and effects
of Community policies under construction. On matters
which have a direct bearing on Community activities,
close contact will be maintained with the InstitUtions of
the Community. They agreed that the Foreign Ministers
should produce, not later than 30. June, 1973, a second
report on methods of improving political co-operation
in accordance with the Luxembourg report.ANNEX 4
5. Second Report of the Foreign Ministers
to the Heads of State and Government
of the I\t1ember States of the European
Community of 23 July 1973
( Copenhagen Report)
The Foreign Ministers of the nine Member. St:nes of the
European Communities, in carrying out the instruction
given them in para. 14 of the Declaration of the Paris
Summit Conference of 21 October 1972, have submit-
ted the second report on the European Political Co-op-
eration. The Heads of State and Government have
approved the report.
The following is the text of the report:
Part I.
The Heads of State or of Government of the Member
States of the European Communities approved on 27 Oc-
tober 1970 the Report of the Foreign Ministers drawn up
in implementation  of  paragraph 15 of the Communique
of The Hagu~ Conference of 1 and 2 December 1969. The
document reflected the belief that progress towards
concerted action in the field of foreign policy was likely
to promote the development of the Communities and to
help the Europeans to realize more fully their common
responsibilities. The objectives of that co-operation are:
to ensure, by means of regular consultations and ex-
changes of information, improved mutual understand-
ing as regards the main problems of international
relations;
to strengthen solidarity between Governments by pro-
moting the harmonization of their views and the
alignment of their positions and, wherever it IIIppca-rs
possible and desirable, joint action.The Report also proposed that the Foreign Ministers
should submit a second general report which 'Would,  inter
alia,  contain an assessment of the results obtained from
such consultation. At the time when the enlargement of
the European Communities became a fact, paragraph 14
of the Summit Declaration in Paris on 21 October 1972
required the Foreign Ministers to produce by 30 June
1973 a second report on methods of improving political
co-operation in accordance with the Lllxembourg Report.
The Heads of State or of Government, meeting in Paris
expressed their satisfaction at the results obtained since
the political co-operation machinery was formally set up
on the basis of the texts of 27 October 1970. In several
fields, the Member States have been able to consider and
decide matters jointly so as to make common political
action possible. This habit has also led to the "reflex" of
co-ordination among the Member States which has pro-
foundly affected the relations of the Member States be-
tween each other and with third countries. This collegiate
sense in Europe is becoming a real force in international
relations.
The Ministers note that the characteristically pragmatic
mechanisms set up by the Luxembollrg Report have
shown their flexibility and effectiveness. What is involved
in fact is a new procedure in international relations and
an original Ellropean contriblltion to the techniqlle of
arriving at concerted action. The experience acquired so
far has resulted in a strengthening of the belief in the
usefulness of concerted action by means of direct contact
between senior officials of Foreign Ministries and of a
very thorough preparation of the matters Ilnder consider-
ation as a b'1sis for the decisions by Ministers.
Such concerted action has also had a positive influence in
so far ;IS it has brought .a more conscious collaboration
between representatives of Member States of the Com-
munities in third countries. They have been encouraged to
meet and compare the information available to them. Thishabit of working tOgether has enabled the procedure for
concerted action to become more widespread wherever
common action ot common consideration seemed desir-
able.
In the Luxembourg Report provision was made for the
Commission to be invited to make known its views when
the work of the Ministers affected the activities of the
European Communities. The Foreign Ministers express
satisfaction that these contacts have now become a reality
and that a constructive and continuing dialogue is in
course both at the level of experts and of the Political
Committee, and at ministerial meetings.
The colloquy with the Political Commission of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the conlmunication by the President
of .theCouncil to the European Parliament have pUt into
effect the desire of the Foreign Ministers to make a
col'tribution to the democratic character of the construc-
tion of political union.
The final Declaration of the Conference of Heads of
State or of Government held on 19-21 October 1972
expressed inter alia,  the conviction that Europe must be
able to make its voice heard in world affairs and to
affirm its own views in international relations.
Europe now needs to establish its position in the world as
a distinct entity, especially in international negotiations
which are likely to have a decisive influence on the
international equilibrium and on the futUre of the Euro-
pean Community.
In the light of this it is essential that, in the spirit of the
conclusions of the Paris Summit Conference, co-operation
t\ffiong the Nine on forcign policy should be such as to
enable Europe to make an original contribution "to the
international equilibrium. Europe has the will to do this
in accordance with its traditionally outward-looking mis-
sion and its interest in progress, peace and co-operation. It
will do so, loyal to its traditional friends and to thealliances of its Member States, in the spirit of  good
neighbourliness which must exist between aU the countries
- of Europe both to the east and the west, and responding
to the expectations of aU the developing countries.
The res1.llts obtained by the procedure of political consul-
t:ltion since its inception, referred to in the preceding
paragraphs, are the subject of a descriptive Annex at-
tached to this Report.
Part II.
In implementation of the task entrusted to them by para-
graph 14 of the Paris Summit Declaration, and having
regard to the objective which the Heads of State or of
Government set themselves, namely to transform, before
the end of the present decade, the whole complex of the
relations between the Member States of the European
Communities into a European Union, the Foreign Minis-
ters propose that the Heads of State or of Government
approve the following measures:
1.  Ministerial Meetings
Henceforth, the Foreign Ministers wiII meet four times a
year. They may also, whenever they consider it necessary
to ~onsult each other on specific subjects between meet-
ings, mcet for that p1.lrpose when they happen to come
together on other occasions.
2.  The Political Committee of the Member States of the
Europe,m Communities
The Political Directors of the Member States of the Com-
munity will meet in the Political Committee of the Mem-
ber States of the European Communities with a view to
preparing ministerial meetings and carrying out tasks en-
trusted to them by the Ministers. In order to attain that
objective, meetings of the Committee wiII be held as
frequently as the intensification of the work requires.3.  TIJeGroup of "Correspondant$"
A groJIp consisting of European "Correspondants" in the
Foreign Ministry (called the Group of Correspondams)
wiII be set up. That Group wiII be entrusted with the task
of following the implementation of political co-operation
and of studying problems of organization and problems
of a general nature. Furthermore, for certain matters, the
Group will prepare the work of the Political Committee
on the basis of instructions given by that Committee.
4.  Working Parties
(a) In order to ensure more thorough consultation on
individual questions, working parties will be set up to
bring together senior officials of the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs responsible for the subject under consideration.
These working parties will cease to meet as soon as they
have completed the task entrusted to them. Exceptionally,
and especially in order to ensure continuity if the work
can be completed in the near future, the chairman of a
working party may be required to continue in office
beyond the usual period.
(b) The chairman in office may approach the Political
Committee about the need to bring together senior of-
ficials of the major ministerial departments who have
not met during the preceding six month period with a
view to keeping them in contact with each other.
5.  Medium a~/d Long-Term Studies
In accordance with paragraph 14 of the Declaration of
the Paris Summit Conference, which set as an objective on
political co-operation the formulation; where possible, of
common medium and long term positions, several methods
of work can be envisaged. According to circumstances
this wiII be done either by groups of experts in addition
to the current matters which they normally deal with, or
by entrusting the preparations of such studies to a specialanalysis and research group consi$ting normally of offi~
cials.
The Political Committee will propose to the Foreigll
Ministers specific subjects forsrody.
6.  The Role of the Embassies of the Nine in the Capitals
of the Member Countries of the Community
The Embassies of the Nine participate closely in the
implementation of political co-operation. In particular,
they receive information on a Community basis issued by
the Foreign Ministry of their country of residence. Fur-
thermore, they are occasionally entrusted with consulta-
tions on specific subjects:
at the seat of the Presidency at the request of the
Political Committee, the Presidency or another Mem-
ber State; or
in another Capital at the request of the Foreign Minis-
try.
They will appoint one of their diplomatic staff who will
specifically be entrusted with ensuring the necessary con-
tacts with the Foreign Ministry of their country of resi~
denee, within the framework of political co-operation.
7.  Roles of the Embassies in Third Countries and of the
Offices of Permanent Representatives to Major lnterna-
tion.d Orga7JIzations
With the introduction of the political co-operation
machinery, it proved useful to associate Embassies and
Permanent Representatives' offices with the work. In the
lio;ht of the experience gained, better information on the
work in progress in the field of political co-operation
should be provided so as to enable them, where necessary,
to put forward in an appropriate form those aspects
which they consider of inte",t for this work, including
considerations on joint action,""ith this in mind, the Political Committee will nOtify the
missions concerned when it considers it necessary to ob~in
a contribution on a specific item of its agenda. Where
appropriate, it may require a .common report to be pre-
pared by them on specific questions.
In addition to the provisions contained in the texts in
force governing reciprocal inform:J.tion on the occ:J.sion of
import:J.nt visits, the Ambassador concerned, accredited in
the country where the visit takes place, should first pro-
vide infprmation to his colleagues On the spot so as to
enable any appropriate exchange of views. After the visit,
such inforrnation as may interest them should be given to
them in the most appropriate manner.
Finally, in application of the provisions governing the
r&le of missions abroad, the permanent representatives of
the Member States to the major intern:J.tional org:J.niza-
tions wiI! regularly consider matters together and, on the
basis of instructions received, will seek common positions
in regard to important questions dealt with by those
organizations.
8.  The Presidency
As regards the internal organization of the work of polit-
ical co-operation, the Presidency:
sees to it that the conclusions adopted at meetings of
Ministers and of the Political Committee are imple-
mented on a collegiate basis;
proposes, on its own initiative or on that of another
State, consultation at an appropriate level;
may also, between meetings of the Political Commit-
tee, meet the Ambassadors of the Member States in
order to inform them of the progress of the work of
political co-pperation. The meeting may take place at
the request of an Ambassador of a Member State
seeking consultation on a specific subject,Experience has also shown that the Presidency's task
presents a partic\llarly heavy administrative b\ltden. Ad-
ministrative assistance may therefore be provided by
other Member States for specific tasks.
9.  Improvement of Contact between the Nine
The Foreign Ministers have agreed to establish a commu-
nications system with a view to facilitating direct contact
between their departments.
10. Relations with the European Parliament
Having l'egard to the widening scope of the E\lropean
Communities and the intensification of political co-oper-
ation at allleve!s, four colloquies will be held each year at
which the Ministers will meet with members of the Politi-
c:d Committee of the European Parliament. For the pur-
pose of preparing the colloquies, the Political Committee
will draw to the attention of Ministers proposals adopted
by the European Parliament on foreign policy questions.
In addition the Minister exercising the function of Presi-
dent will continue, as in the past, to submit to the Euro-
pe:ln Parliament, once a year, a communication on prog~
ress made in the field of political co-operation.
11.  Priorities to be set in respect of the Matters to be
dealt with within the framework of Political Co-oper-
atio/l
Govcrnmcnts will consult each other on all important
forcign policy questions and will work out priorities,
obscrving the following criteria:
the purpose of the consultation is to see!, common
policics on practical problems;
the subject dealt with must concern E\lropean interests
whether in Europe itself or elsewhere where the adop-
tion ofa common position is .necessary or desirable.On these questions each State undertakes as a general rule
not to take up final positions without prior consultation
with its partners within the framework of the political
co-operation machinery.
The Political Committee will submit to the meetings 
Foreign Ministers subjects among which the Ministers may
select those to be given priority in the course of political
co-operation. This is without prejudice to the examination
of mlditional subjects either at the suggestion of a Mem-
ber State or as a result of recent developments.
12.  Relationship between the Work of the Political Co-
operation Mflchinery and that carried out within the
framework of the European Communities
(a) The Political Co-operation machinery, which deals on
the intergovernmental level with problems of intern 
tional politics, is distinct from and additional to the
activities of the institutions of the Community which
arc based on the juridical commitments undertaken by
the Member States in the Treaty .of Rome. Both sets
of machinery have the aim of contributing to the
development of European unification. The relation-
ship between them is discussed below.
(b) The Political Co-operation machinery, which is re-
sponsible for dealing with questions of current interest
and where possible for formulating common medium
and long term positions, must do this keeping in
mind inter alia,  thei!l1plications for and the effccts
in the field of international politics, Community
policies under construction.
For matters which have an incidence on Community
activities close contact will be maintained with the
institutions of the Community. 
(c) The last section of the previous paragraph is imple-
mented in the following way:
the Commission is invited to make known its
views in accordance with current practice;the Council, through thc President of the Com-
mittee of PermanemRepresentadves, is informed
by the Presidency of the agreed conclusions which
result from the work of the Political Co-operation
machinery, to the extent that these conclusions
have an interest for the work of the Community;
the Ministers will similarly be able, if it is so
desired, to instruct the Political Co-operation
machinery to prepare studics on certain political
aspeCtS of problems under examination in the
framework of the Community. These reports will
be transmitted to the Council through the Presi-
dent of the Committee of Permanent Representa-
tlVes.
In drawing up this Report, the Ministers have demon-
strated their belief that even more important than the
contents of their proposals is the spirit in which these are
put into effect. That spirit is the one that emerges from
the decisions taken at the Paris Summit meeting.
The Ministers consider that co-operation on foreign policy
mUSt be phccd in the perspective of European Union.
From noW on, it is of the greatest importance to seek
common pf)sitions on major international problems.ANNEX
Results obtained from European Political Co-operation
on Foreign Policy
3.  Group of "Correspondants
(Luxembourg Report-Second Part, VII-
In order to facilitate the internal organization of political
co-operation, the Luxembourg Report provided that each
State should :tppoint from within its Ministry of Foreign
Affairs an official who should act as the "correspondant
of his opposite numbers in other States. These officials
were established as a "Group of Correspondants ; this
Group, in addition to the task of drafting summaries of
the conclusions reached at ministerial meetings and meet~
inbs of the Political Committee, was entrusted with the
duty of closely following the implementation of political
co-operation and of studying the problems of organiz-
f~rt and those of a gene.ral nature. as 'Well as particular
problems the Political Committee gave it to examine, in
particular for the purpose of preparing their meetings.
4.  Activities of Embassies of the Nine in the Capitals of
Member States of the Communities 
The r&le of Ambassadors of the Nine in the capitals of
Member States has proved important for the implementa~
tion of political co-operation in particular with respect to
the exchange of information. In order to facilitate con~
tacts with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in the coun~
tries of their residence with respect to matters of political
co-operation. each of these Embassies has appointed a
diplomat on its staff whose special duty is to ensure
contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its coun-
try of residence on matters of political co-operation.
Since the Ambassadors receive information concerning the
Community from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of their
country of residence and, in particular, since they are
expected by the Political Committee to engage in discus-
S:O:JS from time to time, in the capite! of the Presidency,
it is important that they should be fully informed of the
progress of political co-operation with the implementation
of which their missions are associated.
5.  Asso.ciation of Ambassadors in Third Countries and of
Permanent Representatives to International Organizations
with tbe Political Co-operation
It has been judged necessary and in line with the Luxem-
bourg Report to associate Heads of the .diplomatic mis.
sions of the Nine with political co-operation. For that
purpose, it h;\S been arranged that thl: Political Commit-
tee can ask Ambassadors accredited to a particular coun-
try to provide it with reports and thus to encourage
co-operation among the diplomatic representatives of
Member States.It had also been arranged that regular discus.ions can
take place between Ambassadors accredited to countries
other than those of the Community, on problems of
common interest concerning .the country to which they are
accredited, in accordance with such procedures as the
Ambassadors themselves would find appropriate.
These provisions were put into operation and developed
during the first twO years of political co-operation.
Heads of diplomatic missions in many posts, or their
representatives, while taking account of local conditions,
take part increasingly in political co-operation, especially
through exchanges of view and in certain cases by means
of joint reports.
6.  Commission of the Ellropean Commllnities
(Luxembourg Report-Second Part, V)
The Luxembourg Report provides that:
should the work of the Ministers affect the activities
of the European Communities, the Commission will be
invited to make known its views.
In accordance with this the Commission of the Communi-
ties has been invited to participate in ministerial discus-
sions and in sessions of the Political Committee and of
groups of experts when the agenda of the meeting pro-
vides for the examination of questions affecting the activ-
ities of the Communities: for example, the examination of
problems relating to the economic aspects of the CSCE
and to the futUre r&le of the Council of E1.lrope.
7.  European Parliament
(Luxembourg Report-Second Part, ' VI , and Third
Part, 4)
In accordance with the Luxembourg Report which pro-
vided for two methods of associating public opinion and
its reprcsentativesw~th tI:e deyel~~~I1t oi.g!,I~i~111 cl)-
operation, Ministers for Foreign Affairs and members of
the Political Commission of the European Parliament held
a colloquy every six months and the President in office of
the Council reported every year to the Parliament on the
progress of work concerning the best means of advancing
towards political union.
At the last two colloquies, a new procedure, consisting
esscnti::t1ly of the notification in advance to the Political
Commission of the European Parliament of the main
subjects for discussion, was adopted in order to make the
exchange of views more fruitful.ANNEX 5
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8. Document on The European Identity
published by the Nine Foreign Ministers
(Copenhagen, 14 December 1973)
The Nine Member Countries of the European Commun-
ities have decided that the time has come to draw up a
document on the European Identity. This will enable
them to achieve a better definition of their relations with
other countries and of their responsibilities and the place
which they  occupy  in world affairs. They have decided
to define the European Identity with the dynamic nature
of the Community in mind. They have the intention of
carrying the work further in the future in the light of the
progress made in the construction of a UnhedEurope.
Defining the European Identity involves:
reviewing the common heritage, interests and special
obligations of the Nine, as well as the degree of unity
so far achieved within tbe Community,
assessing the extent to which the Nine are already
acting togetber in relation to tbe reSt of tbe world and
the responsibilities wbich result from this,
raking into consideration the dynamic nature of Euro-
pean unification.
Althougb in tbe past the European countries were indi-
vidually ab1e to playa major rOle on tbe international
scene, present international problems are difficult for any
of tbe Nine to solve alone. International developments
and the growing concentration of power and responsibili-
ty in the hands of a very small number of great powers
mean tbat Europe must unite and speak increasingly with
one voice if it wants tei make itself heard and play itS
proper r61e in the world.The Europe of the Nine is aware that, as it unites, it
takes on new international obligations. European unifica-
tio~ is not directed against anyone, nor is it inspired by a
desIre for power. On the contrary, the Nine are convinced
that their union will benefit the whole international com-
munity since it will constitUte an element ofequi,librium
and a basis for co-operation with all countries whatever
their size, culture or social system. The Nine' intend to
play an active role in world affairs and thus to contribute
in accordance with the purposes and principles of th~
United Nations Charter, to ensuring that international
relations have a more just basis; that the independence
~nd equality. of States are better preserved; that prosperity
IS more equItably shared; and that the security of each
country is more effectively guaranteed. In pursuit of these
objectives the Nine should progressively define common
positions in the sphere of foreign policy.
14.
The close ties between the United States and Europe of
the Nine-we share values and aspirations based .on a
common heritage-are mutually beneficial and must be
preserved. These ties do not conflict with the determina-
tion of the Nine to establish themselves as a distinct and
original entity. The Nine intend to maintain their con-
structiye dialogue and to develop their co-operation with
the United States on the basis of equality and in a spirit
of friendship.
15.
The Nine also remain determined to engage in close co-
operation and to pursue a constructive dialogue with the
other industrialized countries, such as japan and Canada,
which have an essential role in maintaining an open and
balanced world economic system. They appreciate the
existing fruitful co-operation with these countries, particu-
larly within the DECD.
III. The Dynamic Nature of the Construction of a
United Europe
22.
The European identity will evolve as a function of the
dynamic construction of a United Europe. In their
external relations, the Nine propose progressively to
undertake the definition of their identity in relation to
other countries or groups of countries. They believe that
in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion and
contribute to the framing of a genuinely Europe~r; fe'reign
policy. They are convinced that building up 1;hi:; policy
will help them to tackle with confidence 2.0.1 rea~ism
further stages in the construction of a United Europe thus
making easier the proposed transformation of the whole
I:omplex of their relations into a European Union.ANNEX 6
10, Press Statement by Herr Hans-Dietrtch
Genscher, Federal Ministerfor Foreign
Affairs, after the 14 thEPC Ministerial
Meeting (Bonn, 11 June 1974)
The second point is the question of consultations. The
ministers were agreed that in elaborating common posi-
tions on foreign policy there arises the question of consul-
tations with allied or friendly countries. Such consulta-
tions .are a matter of course in any modern foreign policy.
We decided on a pragmatic approach in each individual
case, which m~ans that the country rl(;ldi~ the Presiden-
cy  will be authorized by the other eight partners to hold
consultations on behalf of the Nine.
In practice, therefore, if any member of the EC ra:ses
within the framework of EPC the question of informing
and consulting an ally or a friendly State, the Nine will
discuss the matter and, upon reaching agreement, authorize
the Presidency to proceed on that basis.
The ministers trust that this gentleman s agreement will
also lead to smooth and pragmatic consultations with the
United States which will take into account the interests of
both sides.ANNEX 7
12. Communique issuedafte.r the Meeting
of the Heads of State and Government
(Paris, 10 December 1974)
The Heads of Government bave therefore decided to meet
accompanied  by  the MinisTers of Foreign Aff:-:irs, thre
tip1es a year and, whenever necessary, in the Council of
the Communities and ill the context of politic:!! co-oper:!-
tion.
With a view to progress towards European unity, the
lfcads of Government reaffirm their determination
gr.ldually to adopt common positions and co-ordinate
their diplomatic action in all areas of international affairs
which affect the interests of the European Community.
The Prt:sidc'llt.in-Office will be the spokesman for tile
Nine and will set OUt their views in international diplo-
macy. He will ensure that the necessary concertation al~
ways t;.kes place in good time.
In view of the increasing r8le of political co-operation
in the consrructionof Europe, the Europe:lIl Assembly
must be more closely associated with the work of the
Presidency, for example through replies to questions on
political co-operation put to him by its Members.ANNEX 8
31. Statement by the 6th European Coun-
cil on European Union
(The Hague, 29/30 November 1976)
The construction of Europe must also make the best use of
possibilities for co-operation between the nine Govern-
m'~nts in those areas where the Member States are
prepared to exercise their sovereignty in a progressively
convergent m:.umer.
This form of co-operation in the field of foreign policy
must lead  to  the search for a common external policy.ANNEX 9
45. Resolution of the European Parlia-
ment on the European Political Co-
operation (19 January 1978)
The European Parliament
noting the development of political co-operation ma-
chinery between the Nine over recent years,
considering that the links between the Foreign Minis-
ters of the Nine and the European Parliament must be
improved and strengthened, particularly with a view
to providing the European Parliament with wider
scope for exercising influence over political co-oper-
ation
regretting the instances of failure to coordinate the
Dositions and action of the nine Member States of the
Community, particularly in certain cases, in the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations and in other in-
ternational fora
expressing its concern at the lack of substantive and
up-to-date information given to the European Parlia-
ment by the foreign Ministers of the Nine concerning
measures of joint foreign policy,
A. Requests the Government of the Member States:
to ensure that the European Parliament is fully informed
concerning all joint foreign policy decisions taken by the
Nine;
to provide Parliament s Political Affairs Committee, in an
appropriate form, with substantive and up-to-date infor-
mation concerning the meetings and activities of the For-
eign Ministers of the Nine outside the quarterly meetings
and subsequent colloquies;to take- account of the foreign policy guidelin.e5 adopted
by the European Parliament;
to instruct the Foreign Ministers to submit a written an-
nual report on European political co-operation to the
European Parliament one month in advance of the an-
nual debate in Parliament on European political co-oper-
ation;
to decide to end the artificial distinction between 'Com-
munity' and 'political co-operation' matters, and, in this
respect, to invite the Commission to participate fully in all
partes of all political co-operation meetings;
to instruct the Foreign Ministers to seek agreement on the
political and related aspects of negotiations with third
countries before the Council of Ministers gives a mandate
to the Commission to open negotiations and to establish
this mandate in the light of an "orientation debate held by
the Parliament;
to ensure that the Commission represents the Community
in all major multilateral economic negotiadons following
agreement by the Foreign Ministers on the political and
related aspects of such negotiations;
B. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to-
gether with the report of its committee to the Council, the
Foreign Ministers meeting in political co-operation, the
Commission and to the Parliaments and Governments of
the Member States.